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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3136 
 ___________ 
 
FRANC CUTAJ, 
       Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                               Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A078-825-606) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 9, 2012 
 
 Before: AMBRO, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 12, 2012) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Franc Cutaj petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen.  We will deny the petition. 
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I. 
  Cutaj is a citizen of Albania who attempted to enter the United States without 
valid documents in 2001 and who concedes that he is removable on that basis.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).  He applied for asylum and other relief on the ground that 
he fears persecution on account of his and his father’s membership in Albania’s 
Democratic Party.  He also claimed to have been targeted because political opponents 
blamed his father for someone’s death in an automobile accident in 1999.  The 
Immigration Judge denied his application and ordered his removal to Albania, and the 
BIA dismissed his appeal on October 7, 2002.  Cutaj later filed a motion to reopen on the 
ground that family members of the man killed in the automobile accident had declared a 
“blood feud” and were seeking revenge against his family.  The BIA denied that motion 
on February 14, 2003.  Cutaj did not petition for review of either of the BIA’s decisions. 
 Cutaj later filed another motion to reopen in 2011, which is the motion at issue 
here.  He claims both that the political situation in Albania has deteriorated since his last 
hearing and that incidents of blood-feud killings are on the rise.  He supported each claim 
with a separate expert report and with various news articles.  The BIA denied the motion 
on July 13, 2011, as both untimely and number-barred and not within the exception for 
claims based on materially changed country conditions.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  The BIA concluded that neither the 
political situation nor blood-feud violence had changed in a material way.  The BIA also 
concluded that Cutaj’s blood-feud claim was not based on a statutorily protected ground 
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and was undercut by the lack of evidence that any of his family members have been 
harmed in Albania.  Cutaj petitions for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we review the denial of 
reopening for abuse of discretion.  See Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 
2009).  We will not disturb the BIA’s ruling unless it is “‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.’”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  We 
review the BIA’s underlying assessment of the record for substantial evidence and may 
not disturb it unless “‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.’”  Liu, 555 F.3d at 148 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).   
 Cutaj challenges the BIA’s ruling on two principal grounds, but each lacks merit.  
First, Cutaj argues that the record does not support the BIA’s conclusion that conditions 
in Albania have not materially changed.  With regard to the political situation in Albania, 
Cutaj relies primarily on evidence of social unrest and violence following elections in 
2009, in which the Democratic Party retained the control it had gained in 2005.  (A.R. 39-
66, 75-89.)  The BIA acknowledged that Cutaj’s evidence shows certain changes since 
his hearing in 2001, but it concluded that they are not material to his claim.  The evidence 
does not compel a contrary conclusion.  Cutaj claims to fear persecution as a member of 
the Democratic Party.  What his evidence shows, however, is that the Democratic Party 
came to power in 2005 and remains in power today.  The recent civil unrest described in 
Cutaj’s evidence does not compel the conclusion that the political situation is materially 
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worse for him now than at the time of his hearing in 2001, before his party came to 
power.  See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 n.3, 161 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting claim of changed country 
conditions by Albanian Democratic Party member on the basis of similar evidence). 
 Cutaj also argues that his evidence shows a recent increase in killings attributable 
to blood feuds in general.  The BIA concluded instead that the evidence shows merely the 
persistence of blood feuds in Albania, which have occurred for centuries and which 
resurfaced after the fall of Albania’s Communist dictatorship in the 1980s.  (BIA Dec. at 
1) (citing A.R. 94-95).  The persistence of such conditions is an adequate basis to deny a 
motion to reopen, see Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 161, and our own review of the evidence 
satisfies us that the BIA’s conclusion is neither arbitrary nor irrational.  To the contrary, 
the BIA’s conclusion has ample support in the record, which does not compel the 
conclusion that Cutaj faces a materially greater risk of blood-feud violence now than he 
did in 2001.  (A.R. 91-104, 114-57.)1
 Cutaj’s second general argument is that the BIA inadequately addressed his 
evidence and denied him due process by failing to give it proper consideration.  We 
 
                                                 
1 In addition to concluding that Cutaj failed to show materially changed country 
conditions, the BIA rejected his reliance on the blood feud because it does not relate to a 
statutorily protected ground and because he had not shown that any of his family 
members have been harmed since the feud began in 1999.  We need not address these 
conclusions because the BIA’s assessment of country conditions is dispositive.  We note, 
however, that Cutaj has challenged the first conclusion by invoking a “particular social 
group” for the first time on review and has not challenged the second conclusion at all. 
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disagree.  The BIA identified his evidence, fairly summarized its contents, and explained 
why it does not show that country conditions have changed in a material way.  The BIA 
thus both “‘demonstrate[d] that it has considered [Cutaj’s] evidence” and “‘provide[d] us 
with more than cursory, summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern 
its reasons for declining to afford relief[.]’”  Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268 (quoting Wang v. 
BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  Those reasons are adequately supported by the 
record, and the BIA was not required to address the record in this case in any more detail 
than it did.2
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
 
  
                                                 
2 Cutaj relies in his reply brief on our recent decision in Abulashvili v. Attorney General, 
663 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2011), but that case is inapposite.  In that case, we held that the 
BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it relied on an 
inadequately supported adverse credibility determination.  See id. at 202-07.  We also 
noted that the BIA had not specifically addressed the petitioner’s claim under the 
Convention Against Torture and noted that it should consider his expert report on 
remand.  See id. at 209 n.12.  In this case, the BIA mentioned both of Cutaj’s expert 
reports, specifically cited one of them, and fairly summarized their contents. 
